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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by focusing on how Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) 
duality and compensation committee quality are related to CEO compensation in the period since passage of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (“SOX”).  Unlike research prior to SOX that focused chiefly on committee members’ 
independence, we measure compensation committee quality in two ways. We consider the average number of board 
directorships held by compensation committee members as well as the proportion of committee members with prior 
or current CEO duality experience. We introduce the latter variable as a new measure of quality as it has not been 
utilized in research conducted prior to or since the passage of SOX. Using a sample of 100 2007 Fortune 500 firms, 
we find that CEO duality does not have a significant effect on CEO compensation. However, we document a 
positive relationship between average number of directorships and CEO compensation and also find evidence that 





Shareholders expect boards of directors (“boards”) to 
protect their interests by insuring that management is 
accountable for their decisions and actions. In short, 
boards act to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent 
problem through a variety of mechanisms and 
processes collectively described as corporate 
governance – they provide oversight, advice and 
counsel to the chief executive officer (“CEO”), 
monitor management’s actions and if necessary 
discipline the CEO (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003, p. 
101). This board function sounds simpler than it is 
since in reality corporate governance is a “complex 
web of multiple interactions and relationships among 
multiple actors in and around the firm”   (van Ees, 
Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2005, p. 5).  
 
Evidence that existing corporate governance 
structures were flawed emerged during the 1990s, 
leading to calls for change. This public outrage over 
corporate fraud led to passage of the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002 (SOX) or “Sarbanes-Oxley” (United States 
Congress, 2002).  Legislative changes mandated by 
SOX and subsequent regulations issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
required stricter corporate governance rules designed 
to increase the quality of oversight by boards of 
directors. In particular, the SEC regulations affect the 
composition and responsibilities of the board’s 
compensation committee with its most significant 
provision mandating that publicly traded firms may 
not have any “insiders” on the committee; rather, the 
compensation committee must be composed entirely 
of independent board directors.  
 
The capacity of a board to monitor management 
effectively depends on the distribution of power 
between the board and its CEO (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 2010). An important indicator of CEO 
power over a board is CEO duality (Baliga & Moyer, 
1996; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), a term used to 
describe a “combined” leadership structure where the 
same individual holds both the position of board 
chair and CEO.  This contrasts with a “split” 
leadership structure where the CEO and board chair 
positions are held by two individuals  (Schooley, 
Renner, & Allen, 2010). Although the intent of SOX 
was to enhance board oversight as a means to restore 
investor confidence, the law does not establish any 
restriction on a CEO also serving as board chair. .  
The absence of a mandate by SOX to separate the 
leadership structure raises the question as to whether 
the presence of CEO duality may undermine the 
capacity of a board or its compensation committee to 
carry out its role independently.  
 
A large and rich body of research investigates how 
CEO duality and board independence impact firm-
level outcomes such as financial performance (e.g., 
Baliga & Moyer, 1996; Iyengar & Zampeli, 2009; 
Lam & Lee, 2008) and individual-level outcomes 
such as CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999; Dorata & Petra, 2008; Fosberg, 1999; 
Sapp, 2008).  Mixed findings from these studies 
prevent clear conclusions as to whether CEO duality 
is associated with higher levels of compensation. 
What is clear is that CEOs continue to receive 
lucrative, some would argue excessive, compensation 
 
 
and despite calls to separate the two positions and a 
substantial number of studies on the consequences of 
CEO duality, many firms continue to be led by 
individuals who hold both the CEO and chair 
positions. In the US, CEO duality continues to be the 
dominant board leadership structure (Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2007; Lam & Lee, 2008) with about 70% 
of the largest public US firms being led by dual 
CEOs for the past 20 years  (Giove, Connolly, & 
Lilienfeld, 2011).  
 
Research that investigates the effect of compensation 
committee quality on CEO compensation typically 
relies on data from the pre-SOX period and generally 
examines the effect of compensation committee 
independence on executive compensation. (Newman 
& Mozes, 1999)  With the passage of SOX, however, 
boards and compensation committees must comply 
with the legislated mandate of director independence, 
effectively eliminating it as a meaningful measure of 
board or committee quality.  Scholars have begun to 
examine compensation committee quality using 
variables other than independence (Sapp, 2008; Sun 
& Cahan, 2009). Further, recent studies measure the 
composition and quality of the committee and their 
effects on CEO compensation directly or in 
combination with firm performance (e.g., Conyon & 
Peck, 1998).  Little research examines the 
relationship among these three critical corporate 
governance variables: CEO duality, compensation 
committee quality and CEO compensation. In fact, 
we found the relationship between CEO duality and 
CEO compensation to be a primary focus in only nine 
studies prior to the passage of SOX. Research that 
examines corporate governance in the post-SOX era 
is just now emerging (e.g., Petra & Dorata, 2008; 
Sapp, 2008; Switzer & Tang, 2009; Huang, Lai, 
McNamara, & Wang, 2011; Valenti,  2008).  We 
identified only four published empirical studies that 
examine the relationship between CEO duality and 
CEO compensation and only two of those studies use 
exclusively post-SOX data.  
 
This paper contributes to the corporate governance 
literature by focusing on how CEO duality and 
compensation committee quality are related to CEO 
compensation in the post-SOX period.  In particular, 
we build on the work of Sun and colleagues (2009) to 
investigate the role that average directorships plays in 
affecting committee quality and determining CEO 
compensation.  We extend their work by introducing 
a new measure of committee quality, the proportion 
of CEO directors on the committee who have prior or 
current CEO duality experience themselves. First, we 
examine the impact of corporate governance 
measures of quality on CEO compensation using 
post-SOX data. Second, we specifically focus on the 
quality characteristics of the compensation 
committee, rather than the corporate board as a 
whole. Third, we examine CEO duality as a 
moderator of the relationship between compensation 
committee quality and CEO compensation. 
 
 We organize this paper as follows.  We explain our 
choice of agency theory as the primary conceptual 
framework to guide our analysis. Next, we briefly 
review the role of the compensation committee and 
describe the changes that resulted from SOX as they 
apply to the committee. We clarify the terminology 
surrounding “independence” and “quality” as well as 
CEO duality.  We then review the relevant literature 
on the relationships among CEO duality, CEO 
compensation and compensation committee quality, 
present our theoretical model and hypotheses, and 
describe our research design and findings.  We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our 
findings for practice and future research and 






Research on corporate governance relies largely on 
agency theory although a visible subset of work (e.g. 
Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007; Boivie, Lange, 
McDonald, & Westphal, 2011; Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson, 1990) relies on alternative frameworks 
such as stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory. In practice, however, an agency perspective 
has driven recent legislation such as SOX  (Kaufman 
& Englander, 2005) and corporate governance 
research is often premised on the assumption that 
there is an agency problem in corporate control. In 
other words, because the interests of shareholders and 
the CEO diverge and CEOs hold positions of power, 
they are motivated to make decisions and act in ways 
that advance their personal goals  (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  The role of the board is to 
constrain this self-serving behavior by governing the 
relationship between the principal (shareholders) and 
its agent (management) (Erakovic & Overall, 2010) 
through strong, knowledgeable and independent 
directors  (Bennington, 2010).  Therefore, consistent 




The chair of the board has the responsibility to ensure 
the company is following bylaws and policies 
established by the organization, develop agendas for 
board meetings, and guide the board effectively in 
 
 
overseeing management. As the highest ranking 
manager, the CEO is charged with decision making 
related to corporate goals, strategies, risks and 
integrity while collaborating with other top 
executives. When there is CEO duality, a single 
individual is accountable for completion of both sets 
of duties. A CEO who is also chair is potentially less 
objective since s/he is not only responsible to pursue 
management’s goals but also to oversee and evaluate 
CEO effectiveness.  
 
While there is good reason for the persistent debate 
about the desirability of CEO duality, agency theory 
suggests that the costs of this leadership structure 
outweigh its benefits. From an agency perspective, 
CEO duality represents less board control over 
management and is therefore inappropriate since it 
restricts the monitoring role of the board, leads to 
greater inherent risk  (Dickins, 2010), CEO 
entrenchment (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & Lee, 
2009; Pfeffer, 1981), increased information 
asymmetry (Kim et al., 2009) and lower firm 
performance.  But, without CEO duality, it is more 
difficult to assign responsibility for [the firm’s] poor 
performance, increases the costs of information 
sharing, and limits the CEO’s authority to make 
critical decisions and move rapidly to enhance 
shareholder returns.   Opponents of CEO duality 
believe it may enable the CEO to achieve an elevated 
position of power and argue that it leads to CEO 
entrenchment, which “occurs when managers gain so 
much power that they are able to use the firm to 
further their own interests rather than the interests of 
shareholders”   (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003).. 
Advocates of CEO duality cite the value added as a 
result of a single, unified leadership position and 
argue that adequate independent oversight of 
management can be achieved through other 
appropriate board mechanisms, measures and 
activities.   
 
Quality of Compensation Committees  
 
Companies may have different names for the 
committee but its fiduciary role is essentially the 
same regardless of its title. Deloitte (2009) describes 
the practice of the compensation committee as “…to 
set appropriate and supportable pay programs that are 
in the organization’s best interests and aligned with 
its business mission and strategy…”  Further, as 
stated in the 2010 Intel proxy, the committee also: 
“reviews and determines various other 
compensation policies and matters, 
including making recommendations to the 
Board and to management related to 
employee compensation and benefit plans, 
making recommendations to the Board on 
stockholder proposals related to 
compensation matters, and administering the 
employee stock purchase plan”  (Intel, 
2010). 
 
Most researchers agree that the compensation 
committee plays a crucial role in setting both the 
amount and mix of CEO pay  (Barkema & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). The overarching goal is for a quality 
committee to carry out its monitoring responsibilities 
objectively to insure that “executive compensation 
packages are designed to align the incentives of 
executives and a firm’s stakeholders” (Sapp, 2008, p. 
711).  In reality, the “CEO and the Board frequently 
have relationships with one another allowing the 
potential for inter-personal relationships and other 
factors to influence the executive compensation 
process”  (Sapp, 2008, p. 717).   
 
High quality governance can effectively offset the 
agency problem if the board is independent. As Fama 
and Jensen argued  in their seminal paper (1983),  the 
function of monitoring management and settling 
decision disputes is performed best by directors who 
are independent from management and who are 
decision experts  (Mace, 1986) including insiders 
who have knowledge and expertise of the 
corporation’s activities  (Schooley et al., 2010).  SOX 
requires increased board independence to provide 
more protection for shareholders, a mandate that 
reflects an agency perspective (Schooley et al., 
2010).  Included in these regulations is the 
requirement that the compensation committee may 
not have any “insiders”; rather, the committee must 
be composed entirely of independent board directors. 
This change is noteworthy because it impacts the 
actual composition of compensation committees as 
well as scholarship that examines how compensation 
committee characteristics are related to CEO 
compensation.  
 
Studies that investigate compensation committee 
quality using measures other than independence and 
that use post –SOX data are few. (Sapp, 2008) Sapp’s 
(2008) work is notable because although his data are 
taken from both the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods, 
he moved beyond independence to assess 
compensation committee quality and examine 
corporate governance variables in relation to total 
executive compensation packages.  He found that an 
increase in the percentage of current CEOs on the 
compensation committee is associated with an 
increase in CEO compensation. Sapp asserts this 
stems from the condition of “an increase in the 
closeness of the compensation committee to the CEO 
 
 
(more CEOs on the compensation committee means 
the Board is more likely to relate to the concerns of 
the CEO and thus may be willing to pay the CEO 
more...”) (741).  Using pre-SOX data from US firms 
in 2001, Sun and Cahan (2009) studied committee 
quality using compensation committee size and 
individual committee member characteristics in 
relation to executive pay.  Their measurement of 
member characteristics included years of board 
experience both with the company and on other 
boards, corporate ownership, and whether appointed 
by the CEO, Their results  show that CEO cash 
compensation is more positively associated with 
accounting earnings when firms have high 
compensation committee quality. In sum, despite the 
fact that ten years have elapsed since the passage of 
SOX and its mandate for an independent 
compensation committee, relationships among CEO 
duality, compensation committee quality and CEO 
compensation remains understudied.    
 
THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on prior research and the argument posited by 
agency theory, we propose the following theoretical 
model of the relationships among CEO duality, 
compensation committee quality and CEO 
compensation: 
CEO Compensation = f (CEO duality, Compensation 
Committee Quality, Compensation Committee                                    
Meetings, Compensation Committee Size, Financial 
Performance, Industry) 
 
Diagram 1 provides a visual aid of the relationships 
we are testing. See Diagram 1 in the appendix. 
 
Given the conflicting perspectives on the desirability 
of CEO duality, we examine its effect on 
compensation in the post-SOX period. Consistent 
with agency theory, we hypothesize it is positively 
associated with CEO cash compensation. When there 
is CEO duality, the CEO’s compensation is more 
likely to reflect not only accounting performance and 
stock returns but also the effect of the CEO’s 
influence on the compensation committee through his 
or her combined and entrenched role in the company.  
H1: CEO duality is positively associated with CEO 
cash compensation. 
 
Research conducted prior to the enactment of SOX 
frequently used independence as a measure of 
compensation committee quality and results were 
mixed (e.g., Anderson & Bizjak, 2003; Newman & 
Mozes, 1999; Vafeas, 2003). Calls in the post-SOX 
period to identify “…a broader and richer set of 
variables related to the structure and composition of 
the compensation committee”  (Sun & Cahan, 2009, 
p. 193) have increased given the legislative and 
regulatory mandate aimed at increasing committee 
quality by requiring all members to be independent.  
 
Findings from studies that examine variables other 
than independence suggest that higher quality 
oversight by the compensation committee depends on 
members’ available time, experience and expertise 
(e.g., Petra & Dorata, 2008; Sun & Cahan, 2009; Sun, 
Cahan, & Emanuel, 2009).  Directors on one firm’s 
compensation committee who also hold directorships 
with other companies are likely to be very busy. To 
the extent that multiple compensation committee 
members hold other directorships they will have less 
time to fulfill their oversight function and in turn 
committee quality will be reduced. Compared to the 
robust literature on the effects of independence on 
boards, less is known about the consequences for 
corporate governance when board members are busy 
due to outside commitments. There is some evidence 
to suggest that busy directors shirk responsibilities 
leading to weaker corporate governance in the form 
of lower committee quality and higher CEO cash 
compensation (Core et al., 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 
2006; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Sun & 
Cahan, 2009; Sun et al., 2009). In contrast, Ferris and 
colleagues (2003) do not find any evidence that busy 
directors shirk their responsibilities.   
 
Another notable determining indicator of committee 
quality would be members’ experience and expertise 
on the subject of executive compensation. Holding 
multiple directorships could give directors 
opportunities to increase their expertise as well as 
greater incentive to effectively monitor since their 
reputation as a decision expert is on the line ( Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). 
Agency theory suggests that too many directorships, 
the “busy board member hypothesis,” will lower 
directors’ effectiveness as monitors.  Some research 
finds support for this argument (e.g., Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006); however, findings are not 
consistent (e.g., Klein, 1998; Weir, Laing, & 
McKnight, 2002). In a study that explicitly focuses 
on the number of directorships and CEO 
compensation, Sun and colleagues (2009) found that 
a larger average number of directorships leads to 
lower CEO compensation. While a certain amount of 
expertise and prestige is derived from multiple 
directorships, the loss of time and commitment that 
can accompany numerous appointments can cancel 
out the benefits. It is possible that busy directors can 
enhance committee quality; however, the stronger 
argument in our view is that when committee 
 
 
members hold multiple directorships the committee’s 
quality is reduced. 
 
H2a: The average number of directorships held by 
compensation committee members is positively 
associated with CEO cash compensation, indicating 
lower compensation committee quality. 
 
When compensation committee members also hold 
the position of CEO in their own firms, their business 
leadership experience and expertise can enhance 
governance quality. Carpenter & Westphal (2001) 
argue that directors who have prior rather than 
concurrent CEO experience at other firms are able to 
better evaluate potential CEOs. Similarly, when more 
members of the compensation committee have CEO 
experience, the quality of oversight carried out in 
granting CEO compensation may be enhanced 
because the compensation committee is of higher 
quality. The impact of higher quality corporate 
governance is that the CEO’s compensation may be 
more closely associated with accounting and stock 
return measures of the firm than in a situation with 
lower committee quality. Further, when these CEO 
committee members also have prior or current CEO 
duality experience, their objective and independent 
oversight role may be further strengthened, 
enhancing the quality of the compensation 
committee.  
 
As a homogeneous and cohesive collection of 
individuals  (Useem, 1984), when CEOs of other 
firms sit on a board’s compensation committee, some 
posit that they may identify and empathize with the 
firm’s CEO resulting in more support for favorable 
pay decisions and lower governance quality  (Daily et 
al., 1998; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Sun & Cahan, 
2009; Sun et al., 2009). Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) 
failed to find evidence for what they term the “buddy 
hypothesis” in their study of CEOs who sit on boards; 
however, as Sun et al. (2009) point out, there is 
virtually no work that examines specifically the 
effects of members of the compensation committee 
who are also CEOs. A strong case can be made that 
compensation committee members who themselves 
have CEO experience might be more effective 
members because of their expertise and reputation 
(Sun et al., 2009).  Taking it one step further, when a 
compensation committee has a larger proportion of 
members with prior or current CEO experience in 
which they also had CEO duality, the experience and 
expertise of those members enhances committee 
quality.    
 
H2b: The proportion of compensation committee 
members who have prior or current CEO duality 
experience is negatively associated with CEO cash 
compensation, indicating higher compensation 
committee quality. 
 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b test whether attributes of 
compensation committee quality affect CEO 
compensation. However, we expect CEO duality to 
moderate the strength of both of these relationships. 
The interactive effect of the average number of 
directorships of the compensation committee and 
CEO duality on CEO compensation has not been 
tested in prior studies.  Likewise, the interactive 
effective of committee members’ CEO duality 
experience and CEO duality has not been examined 
in prior research.  
 
While we expect the average number of directorships 
of the compensation committee to be positively 
associated with CEO cash compensation (H2a), the 
presence of CEO duality will weaken this positive 
relationship, strengthening the quality of the 
committee.  In this case, compensation committee 
members who serve as directors on a greater number 
of boards will be affected by the presence of a dual 
CEO and will act more judiciously in their 
governance of the dual CEO’s compensation. Thus 
we hypothesize the following: 
 
H3a: CEO duality weakens the positive relationship 
between average number of outside directorships 
held by compensation committee members and CEO 
cash compensation. 
 
While we expect the proportion of compensation 
committee members who have prior or current CEO 
duality experience to be negatively associated with 
CEO cash compensation (H2b), the presence of CEO 
duality will weaken this negative relationship, 
reducing the quality of the committee.  In this case, 
compensation committee members who have CEO 
duality experience are expected to be less judicious in 
their governance of CEO compensation because they 
align more with the dual CEO. Given their similar 
experience and perspective, the objectivity of 
committee members will be compromised in setting 
CEO cash compensation. Therefore we hypothesize 
the following: 
H3b: CEO duality weakens the negative relationship 
between the proportion of compensation committee 
members with prior or current CEO duality 




Model 1:  ln (CashSalary2008) = B0 + B1CEO duality 




AverageDirectorships) + B3Compensation 
Committee Meetings + B4Compensation Committee 
Size + B5Financial Performance (ROE %, Sales 
(log)) + B6Industry  
 
Model 2: ln (CashSalary2008) = B0 + B1CEO duality 
+ B2 Compensation Committee Quality 
(CompCommitteeMemberDuality, 
AverageDirectorships) + B3Compensation 
Committee Meetings + B4Compensation Committee 
Size + B5Financial Performance (ROE %, Sales 








The data set consists of 100 randomly selected 2007 
Fortune 500 Companies. Fortune 500 companies are 
used because their larger executive compensation 
packages have caused the recent controversy 
regarding the level of CEO compensation. All 500 
companies were assigned a random number. The first 
100 firms with the lowest assigned random number 
that met the criteria for the study were selected. In 
total there were 184 exclusions out of 284 Fortune 
500 companies that were examined. A summary of 
the exclusions is provided in Table 1. See Table 1 in 
the appendix. 
 
Financial and public utility companies are excluded 
because the regulation of those industries may mask 
the efficiency differences across firms within the 
industry (Vafeas, 2003). Due to the economic events 
during the latter part of 2008, we include only 
companies with a fiscal year end of December 31, 
2007, thereby avoiding fluctuations in financial 
results for firms with fiscal years ending in 2008. 
Also if there was a change in CEO or CEO duality 
status between 2007 and 2008, the company is 
excluded from the sample. These eliminations are 
made to ensure the consistency of the CEO and their 
position within the firm. There are a variety of factors 
included in “Miscellaneous Exclusions” such as a 
mid-year change in compensation committee 
composition. “Multiple Exclusions” refers to 
circumstances in which a company is excluded from 
the sample for more than one reason, such as being a 





CEO Cash Compensation. CashSalary2008 is the 
dependent variable and captures the cash component 
of CEO compensation in calendar year 2008. The log 
of cash compensation is used so that the difference in 
magnitude of compensation across companies is 
reduced, and it is more likely the variable has a 
normal distribution (Sun & Cahan, 2009). CEO cash 
compensation was obtained from each company’s 
2008 proxy statement. Similar to prior studies of 
executive compensation, we use cash compensation 
since it reflects current CEO performance rather than 
future performance, thus representing the immediate 
reward component of compensation (Sun & Cahan,  
2009). Based on previous studies using agency theory 
as the framework for executive compensation, cash 
compensation helps align the interests of 





CEODuality represents whether or not the CEO of 
the corporation is also the board chair in 2007. 
CEODuality is a dummy variable where ‘1’ signifies 
that CEO duality exists and ‘0’ signifies split 
leadership.  This information was gathered by 
examining disclosures on company websites and its 
2007 and 2008 annual reports. The CEO duality 
status was verified over these two years to ensure 
consistency of the individual serving in that capacity 
in both years.   
   
Compensation Committee Quality.  We measure the 
quality of the compensation committee using two 
variables: the average number of directorships held 
by committee members (AverageDirectorships) and 
the proportion of compensation committee members 
with prior or current experience as a CEO with 
duality (CompCommitteeMemberDuality).   
AverageDirectorships is determined using the 
weighted average number of other board 
directorships held by members of the compensation 
committee in 2007. This variable is calculated by 
dividing the sum of current other directorships held 
by all compensation committee members by the total 
number of members serving on the committee. 
Information about current other directorships was 
gathered from committee members’ biographies 
provided in the company’s proxy statements.  
CompCommitteeMemberDuality represents the 
proportion of compensation committee members (in 
2007) who either have prior or current experience 
serving as both CEO and board chair of a company. 
This variable is calculated by dividing the total 
number of CEOs on the committee who have prior or 
 
 





Consistent with prior research on executive 
compensation, we include control variables in our 
analysis.  The variable Meetings measures the 
number of compensation committee meetings held 
during the calendar year 2007. This information is 
reported in the company proxy statements.  
CommitteeSize represents the number of directors 
serving on the compensation committee in 2007 and 
is also reported in proxy statements. Prior studies 
examine the size of the board in relation to CEO 
compensation (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1999; Core 
et al., 1999). Since this study examines the effect of 
compensation committee quality on executive 
compensation, we use the size of the compensation 
committee rather than the size of the entire board. 
Return on Equity (“ROE”) measures the financial 
performance using the percentage return for the 
calendar year 2007. Controlling for company size, 
Sales represents the log of sales of the company for 
the fiscal year 2007.  ROE and Sales data were 
obtained from the Mergent Online database. Industry 
represents the company’s classification according to 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), also 
obtained from the Mergent Online database. The five 
industries used are mining, manufacturing, 
communication, retail and service. Each industry is 
represented by a dummy variable for that industry 
and the service industry is withheld from the model 




Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive results 
for the sample data collected. Table 3 presents a 
breakdown of the sample by industry.  Table 4 
summarizes the correlations among the study 
variables.   See Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the appendix. 
 
The average CEO cash salary in 2008 was 
$1,168,191. Seventy percent of the corporate CEOs 
in the sample had CEO duality, consistent with the 
findings of Giove, Connolly, and Lilienfeld in 2011. 
Forty-two percent of compensation committee 
members had either prior or current CEO duality 
experience. The average number of compensation 
committee meetings was 6.46 times per year, 
somewhat higher than previously documented by 
Vafeas (2003). This higher meeting frequency is 
likely the result of greater emphasis placed on 
corporate governance since the passage of SOX.  The 
average compensation committee size was 4.30 
members, a result that is comparable to the average 
of 4.37 members found by Vafeas (2003). Each 
compensation committee member in our sample held 
on average just over 1.62 other board directorships.  . 
 
Model 1 Empirical Results 
 
Table 5 presents regression results (Model 1) for 
study variables excluding the interaction terms.  
Table 6 includes the interaction terms in the 
regression analysis.  See Tables 5 and 6 in the 
appendix. 
 
Model 1 results summarized in Table 5 do not 
support Hypothesis 1, as there is not a statistically 
significant association between CEO duality with 
CEO cash compensation (B = .138; p=.176).  Thus, 
whether there is split leadership or CEO duality has 
no bearing on CEO cash compensation in this 
sample. The results support Hypothesis 2a, since an 
increase by one in the average number of 
directorships (AverageDirectorships) leads to a 
14.9% (B = .149; p=.008) increase in CEO cash 
compensation. This rise in compensation supports the 
argument that when a compensation committee 
member holds more directorships, the member may 
be less effective in carrying out their oversight role, 
thereby resulting in lower governance quality.  
 
Hypothesis 2b is not supported by Model 1 empirical 
findings. We expected the proportion of 
compensation committee members with prior or 
current CEO duality experience to be negatively 
associated with CEO cash compensation, indicating 
higher compensation committee quality. Although 
the variable CompCommitteeMemberDuality is 
marginally statistically significant (p = .082), the 
coefficient is positive (B=.299). An increase by 10% 
in the proportion of compensation committee 
members with duality is associated with an increase 
in CEO compensation of 2.99%. Thus, when there 
are more committee members with prior or current 
CEO duality experience, it is likely that close inter-
personal relationships between the CEO and those 
committee members compromise the objectivity of 
committee members, resulting in weaker governance 
over executive compensation.  
 
Results for control variables in Model 1 are as 
follows: 1) meetings (B = .039; p = .031), 2) ROE (B 
= - .004; p = .029), 3) log of sales (B = .075; p = 
.102) and 4) the communication industry (B = - .483; 
p = .010). Committee size and other industries did not 
 
 
have significant coefficients.  The R squared for 
Model 1 is .363 and the Adjusted R squared is .284. 
 
Model 2 Empirical Results 
 
Model 2 tests Hypotheses 3a and 3b by adding two 
interaction terms to Model 1.  The change in 
Adjusted R squared from Model 1 to Model 2 (.047) 
is significant at the .05 level (F-change p = .036).  
Consistent with Model 1, the effect of CEO duality 
on CEO cash compensation is statistically 
insignificant (B = .328, p = .144).  Likewise, the 
coefficient for AverageDirectorships is significant 
and positive (B = .278, p < .0001) indicating that 
when the average number of directorships held by 
members of the compensation committee increases, 
so does CEO compensation.  However, the 
coefficient for CompCommitteeMemberDuality is not 
statistically significant (B = -.255, p = .479) in Model 
2. 
 
Hypothesis 3a is supported. We expected that as a 
moderator, CEO duality would weaken the positive 
relationship between average number of directorships 
held by compensation committee members and CEO 
cash compensation, thereby strengthening the quality 
of the committee. The coefficient of the interaction 
term CEODuality*AverageDirectorships (B = -.252, 
p = .022) reflects a significant and strong negative 
association with CEO cash compensation. It indicates 
that in the presence of CEO duality, as the average 
outside directorships increases, CEO compensation 
decreases. Thus, the presence of CEO duality as a 
moderator strengthens the quality of the 
compensation committee as hypothesized. Given 
CEO duality, compensation committee members with 
more directorships tend to be more judicious in their 
governance of executive compensation. The net result 
is that while CEO compensation increases by 27.8% 
when average directorships increases by one, this 
increase is reduced to only 2.6% in this sample when 
there is CEO duality.  
 
Hypothesis 3b receives marginal support. We 
expected that as a moderator, CEO duality would 
weaken the negative relationship between the 
proportion of compensation committee members with 
prior or current CEO duality experience and CEO 
cash compensation. The coefficient of the interaction 
term CEODuality*CompCommitteeMemberDuality 
(B = .690, p = .089) reflects a marginally significant 
positive association with CEO cash compensation.  
This outcome suggests that the presence of CEO 
duality as a moderator weakens the quality of the 
compensation committee in its oversight of CEO 
compensation.  That is, when a higher proportion of 
compensation committee members themselves have 
CEO duality experience, in the presence of a 
company with CEO duality, those committee 
members may tend to align with the corporate dual 
CEO.   This alignment compromises their objectivity 
in carrying out the committee’s responsibilities in 
setting CEO compensation and may reflect closer 




This study investigates the effects of CEO duality on 
compensation committee quality and CEO cash 
compensation in the post-SOX period. Unlike 
research prior to SOX that focused chiefly on 
committee members’ independence, we measure 
compensation committee quality in two ways. We 
consider the average number of board directorships 
held by compensation committee members as well as 
the proportion of committee members with prior or 
current CEO duality experience. We introduce the 
latter variable as a new measure of quality as it has 
not been utilized in research conducted prior to or 
since the passage of SOX. Further, we examine 
whether CEO duality moderates the relationship 
between these measures of compensation committee 
quality and CEO compensation. 
 
In establishing the requirement that all members of 
the compensation committee be independent, the 
intent of SOX legislation and related SEC regulations 
was to improve the committee’s governance quality. 
However, CEO duality was not prohibited for public 
companies subject to these rules.  Consistent with 
agency theory, this condition could undermine the 
ability of compensation committee members to act 
objectively and independently in setting CEO 
compensation. Their decision making may unduly 
favor the dual CEO rather than represent the best 
interests of stockholders by rewarding the CEO based 
on the firm’s financial performance under the CEO’s 
leadership.   
 
Our findings do not support our hypothesis that CEO 
duality is associated with higher levels of CEO cash 
compensation.  However, we present evidence that 
CEO duality moderates the effects of measures of 
committee quality, in both instances weakening the 
impact of these measures. First, the positive 
relationship between average number of directorships 
held by compensation committee members and CEO 
compensation is reduced in the presence of CEO 
duality, suggesting CEO duality strengthens 
committee quality. This outcome indicates that when 
there is a dual CEO, committee members with more 
directorships are inclined to make more careful 
 
 
compensation package decisions in order to protect 
against the tendency of the dual CEO to influence 
those decisions in his or her favor. Thus, in this 
situation, CEO duality is a factor that enhances 
corporate governance by offsetting the tendency of 
“busy” committee members with more directorships 
to otherwise relax their oversight. Second, we 
document a positive relationship between committee 
members’ CEO duality experience and CEO 
compensation. This finding is not what we expected 
and suggests that the “buddy hypothesis” may 
warrant further investigation.  Further, in the 
presence of CEO duality, we also note this positive 
association with CEO compensation is increased, 
which represents a further weakening of 
compensation committee quality. This outcome 
indicates that when there is a dual CEO, committee 
members with prior or current CEO duality 
experience are inclined to relax their objective 
oversight of compensation decisions, reflecting their 
tendency to align with the dual CEO. Thus, CEO 
duality in this circumstance is a factor that 
compromises effective corporate governance by the 
compensation committee, leading to higher CEO cash 
compensation. 
 
Like any study, we recognize that our research has 
some limitations. First, our study uses sample data of 
100 firms drawn from only the largest companies in 
the United States.  It is unclear whether our findings 
can be applied to firms of all sizes or generalized to 
firms operating in other countries. In addition, this 
relatively small sample size may be one explanation 
for the lack of findings in the case of CEO duality’s 
influence on CEO compensation or the marginally 
significant findings in the case of several other 
variables, including CEO duality’s moderating 
influence. Future research may explore the effect of 
compensation committee quality on CEO 
compensation using data from firms of varying sizes 
as well as from international firms. In addition, future 
testing of our hypotheses on a larger sample across 
multiple years may yield different results.  
 
Another limitation is the possibility of omitted 
variables that may influence CEO cash 
compensation. These variables could include other 
CEO characteristics besides CEO duality, other 
corporate governance quality measures of the 
compensation committee, and other financial 
performance measures. Future research should 
incorporate these additional characteristics. The use 
of cash compensation is another limitation of the 
study that could be overcome by including additional 
components of the CEO’s compensation package 
such as bonuses or equity holdings.  Finally, we 
combined into a single variable the compensation 
committee members with prior or current CEO 
duality experience.  Future research may refine the 
analysis by separating those committee members 
with prior CEO duality experience from those 
members who are currently serving as a dual CEO. 
These changes to future research designs might yield 
more conclusive findings.  
 
However, this study contributes theoretically and 
practically to the field of corporate governance and in 
particular has implications for future research on 
CEO duality, compensation committee quality and 
CEO compensation. First, by utilizing post-SOX 
data, our research expands the examination of 
compensation committee quality beyond the narrower 
pre-SOX measure of committee independence. 
Second, we examine a new measure of committee 
quality, which is the prior or current CEO duality 
experience of compensation committee members. 
Consequently, our research contributes to prior 
literature built on agency theory related to the 
influences on the compensation committee in setting 
CEO compensation.  
 
We find the impact of CEO duality on compensation 
committee quality to be a double-edged sword. Our 
results indicate that CEO duality may undermine the 
capacity of the committee to carry out its role 
independently, when a greater proportion of 
committee members have prior or current CEO 
duality experience. Given the higher CEO 
compensation rewarded in this circumstance, 
committee members execute less effective oversight 
since those with CEO duality experience may be less 
likely to oppose the firm’s dual CEO as a sign of 
support of a colleague (Daily, 1998).  In contrast, we 
observe that CEO duality may strengthen the 
committee’s quality in setting CEO compensation, 
since members with multiple board directorships who 
might otherwise be distracted respond to the dual 
CEO by carrying out more judicious oversight in 
setting CEO compensation. Thus, given the mixed 
results on the effect of CEO duality on compensation 
committee quality in determining CEO 
compensation, our work extends the debate regarding 
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Reason for Exclusion Total 
Financial Companies  40 
Public Utilities Companies  23 
Non-Calendar Fiscal Year End  65 
Change in CEO  11 
Change in CEO Duality  2 
Miscellaneous Exclusions  24 
Multiple Exclusions  19 







 Number of committee meetings 
 Committee size 
 Log (Sales) 
 Return on Equity (%) 
 Industry 
 
Quality of Compensation Committee 
Independent variables: 
 Average number of directorships held 
by committee members 










  CashSalary2008 (log) 13.88 0.49 
 
Independent variables: 
CEODuality 0.70 0.46 
AverageDirectorships 1.62 0.84 
CompCommitteeMemberDuality 0.42 0.28 
 
Control Variables: 
Meetings 6.46 2.49 
CommitteeSize 4.30 1.01 
ROE (percentage) 18.27 26.27 
Sales (log) 23.08 1.06 
  
 
                               TABLE 3 
                               Sample Breakdown by Industry  













Pearson Correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8 
1   CashSalary2008 (log)  1        
 
2   CEODuality 
 .14 1       
 (.16)        
 
3   AverageDirectorships 
 .29** -.14 1      
 (.00) (.16)       
 
4   CompCommittee- 
     MemberDuality 
 .31** .26** .18 1     
 (.00) (.01) (.07)      
 
5   CommitteeSize 
 .14 .11 -.12 .11 1    
 (.16) (.28) (.23) (.26)     
 
6   Meetings 
 .18 -.07 .17 .06 -.04 1   
 (.07) (.48) (.09) (.58) (.70)    
 
7   ROE (%)  
 -.07 .24* .03 .14 .05 .05 1  
 (.50) (.02) (.77) (.18) (.60) (.59)   
8   Sales (log)  .25* .17 .24* .27** .16 .08 .09 1 
 (.01) (.09) (.02) (.01) (.11) (.41) (.39)  
(Significance 2-tailed at 1% level)** 



















TABLE 5  
     Model 1 Regression Results    R2=0.363, Adjusted R2=0.284 
  




Statistic P-value Significance 
Intercept 11.255 0.994 11.319 0.000 *** 
Independent Variables: 
     CEODuality 0.138 0.101 1.365 0.176 
 AverageDirectorships 0.149 0.055 2.711 0.008 *** 
CompCommitteeMemberDuality 0.299 0.170 1.760 0.082 * 
Control Variables: 
     Meetings 0.039 0.018 2.196 0.031 ** 
CommitteeSize 0.063 0.043 1.481 0.142 
 ROE (%) -0.004 0.002 -2.220 0.029 ** 
Sales(log) 0.075 0.045 1.653 0.102 * 
Mining 0.331 0.222 1.495 0.139 
 Manufacturing 0.044 0.153 0.870 0.775 
 Communication -0.483 0.184 -2.623 0.010 *** 
Retail -0.043 0.180 -0.390 0.812   
 
TABLE 6 
     Model 2 Regression Results       R2=0.410, Adjusted R2=0.321 
  




Statistic P-value Significance 
Intercept 11.058 1.000 11.059 0.000 *** 
Independent Variables: 
     CEODuality 0.328 0.222 1.476 0.144 
 AverageDirectorships 0.278 0.073 3.800 0.000 *** 
CompCommitteeMemberDuality -0.255 0.359 -0.710 0.479 
 Interaction Terms: 
     CEODuality*AverageDirectorships -0.252 0.108 -2.326 0.022 ** 
CEODuality*CompCommitteeMemberDuality 0.690 0.401 1.721 0.089 * 
Control Variables: 
     Meetings 0.034 0.017 1.949 0.055 ** 
CommitteeSize 0.064 0.043 1.475 0.144 
 ROE (%) -0.004 0.002 -2.624 0.010 *** 
Sales(log) 0.083 0.045 1.857 0.067 * 
Mining 0.293 0.217 1.346 0.182 
 Manufacturing 0.020 0.149 0.134 0.894 
 Communication -0.559 0.182 -3.077 0.003 *** 
Retail -0.066 0.176 -0.376 0.708   
 
***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level 
 
